[00:00:02] Try to Be as Prepared as Possible for Opportunities and Disappointments - 英语演讲 [00:00:07] "Remarks on Class Day 2008" by Ben S. Bernanke, [00:00:12] Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System [00:00:17] It seems to me, paradoxically, [00:00:21] that both long ago and only yesterday [00:00:24] I attended my own Class Day in 1975. [00:00:29] I am pleased and honored to be invited back [00:00:32] by the students of Harvard. [00:00:34] Our speaker in 1975 was Dick Gregory, [00:00:38] the social critic and comedian, [00:00:40] who was inclined toward the sharp-edged and satiric. [00:00:44] Central bankers don't do satire as a rule, [00:00:47] so I am going to have to strive for "kind of interesting". [00:00:52] When I attended Class Day as a graduating senior, [00:00:58] Gerald Ford was President, [00:01:00] and an up-and-coming fellow named Alan Greenspan [00:01:04] was his chief economic adviser. [00:01:07] Just weeks earlier, [00:01:09] the last Americans remaining in Saigon [00:01:11] had been evacuated by helicopters. [00:01:14] On a happier note, [00:01:16] the Red Sox were on their way [00:01:18] to winning the American League pennant. [00:01:20] I skipped classes to attend a World Series game [00:01:24] against the Cincinnati Reds. [00:01:26] As was their wont in those days, [00:01:29] the Sox came agonizingly close to a championship [00:01:33] but ended up snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. [00:01:37] On that score, as on others-disco music [00:01:42] and Pet Rocks come to mind-- [00:01:44] many things are better today than they were then. [00:01:47] In fact, that will be a theme of my remarks today. [00:01:51] Although 1975 was a pretty good year for the Red Sox, [00:01:58] it was not a good one for the U.S. economy. [00:02:02] Then as now, we were experiencing a serious oil price shock, [00:02:07] sharply rising prices for food and other commodities, [00:02:11] and subpar economic growth. [00:02:14] But I see the differences between the economy of 1975 [00:02:19] and the economy of 2008 as more telling than the similarities. [00:02:25] Today's situation differs from that of 33 years ago [00:02:29] in large part because our economy and society [00:02:33] have become much more flexible and able to [00:02:36] adapt to difficult situations and new challenges. [00:02:40] Economic policymaking has improved as well, [00:02:44] I believe, partly because we have learned well [00:02:47] some of the hard lessons of the past. [00:02:50] Of course, I do not want to minimize the challenges [00:02:54] we currently face, and I will come back to a few of these. [00:02:58] But I do think that our demonstrated ability [00:03:01] to respond constructively and effectively to past economic problems [00:03:06] provides a basis for optimism about the future. [00:03:10] I will focus my remarks today on two economic issues [00:03:16] that challenged us in the 1970s and that still do so today-- [00:03:21] energy and productivity. [00:03:24] These, obviously, are not the kind of topics [00:03:27] chosen by many recent Class Day speakers----Will Farrell, Ali G.., [00:03:33] or Seth MacFarlane, to name a few. [00:03:35] But, then, the Class Marshals presumably knew [00:03:39] what they were getting when they invited an economist. [00:03:42] Because the members of today's graduating class-- [00:03:48] and some of your professors-- [00:03:50] were not yet born in 1975, [00:03:52] let me begin by briefly surveying the economic landscape in the mid-1970s. [00:03:59] The economy had just gone through a severe recession, [00:04:04] during which output, income, and employment fell sharply [00:04:08] and the unemployment rate rose to 9 percent. [00:04:12] Meanwhile, consumer price inflation, [00:04:16] which had been around 3 percent to 4 percent earlier in the decade, [00:04:20] soared to more than 10 percent during my senior year. [00:04:25] The oil price shock of the 1970s began in October 1973 when, [00:04:33] in response to the Yom Kippur War, [00:04:36] Arab oil producers imposed an embargo on exports. [00:04:41] Before the embargo, in 1972, [00:04:44] the price of imported oil was about $3.20 per barrel; [00:04:49] by 1975, the average price was nearly $14 per barrel, [00:04:56] more than four times greater. [00:04:58] President Nixon had imposed economy-- [00:05:02] wide controls on wages and prices in 1971, [00:05:06] including prices of petroleum products; [00:05:09] in November 1973, in the wake of the embargo, t [00:05:15] he President placed additional controls on petroleum prices. [00:05:19] As basic economics predicts, [00:05:22] when a scarce resource cannot be allocated by market-- [00:05:26] determined prices, it will be allocated some other way-- [00:05:30] in this case, in what was to become an iconic symbol of the times, [00:05:35] by long lines at gasoline stations. [00:05:38] In 1974, in an attempt to overcome [00:05:43] the unintended consequences of price controls, [00:05:47] drivers in many places were permitted to [00:05:50] buy gasoline only on odd or even days of the month, [00:05:54] depending on the last digit of their license plate number. [00:05:58] Moreover, with the controlled price of U.S. [00:06:01] crude oil well below world prices, [00:06:03] growth in domestic exploration slowed [00:06:09] and production was curtailed--which, [00:06:10] of course, only made things worse. [00:06:12] In addition to creating long lines at gasoline stations, [00:06:18] the oil price shock exacerbated what was already [00:06:22] an intensifying buildup of inflation and inflation expectations. [00:06:28] In another echo of today, [00:06:30] the inflationary situation was further worsened [00:06:33] by rapidly rising prices of agricultural products and other commodities. [00:06:39] Economists generally agree that monetary policy [00:06:45] performed poorly during this period. [00:06:47] In part, this was because policymakers, [00:06:51] in choosing what they believed to be [00:06:53] the appropriate setting for monetary policy, [00:06:56] overestimated the productive capacity of the economy. [00:07:00] I'll have more to say about this shortly. [00:07:03] Federal Reserve policymakers also underestimated [00:07:08] both their own contributions to the inflationary problems [00:07:12] of the time and their ability to curb that inflation. [00:07:16] For example, on occasion they blamed inflation [00:07:21] on so-called cost-push factors [00:07:23] such as union wage pressures and price increases by large, [00:07:28] market-dominating firms; [00:07:29] however, the abilities of unions and firms [00:07:33] to push through inflationary wage [00:07:36] and price increases were symptoms of the problem, [00:07:39] not the underlying cause. [00:07:41] Several years passed before the Federal Reserve [00:07:46] gained a new leadership that better understood [00:07:49] the central bank's role in the inflation process [00:07:52] and that sustained anti-inflationary monetary policies would actually work. [00:07:59] Beginning in 1979, [00:08:01] such policies were implemented successfully-- [00:08:04] although not without significant cost [00:08:07] in terms of lost output and employment-- [00:08:10] under Fed Chairman Paul Volcker. [00:08:13] For the Federal Reserve, [00:08:15] two crucial lessons from this experience were, [00:08:18] first, that high inflation can seriously destabilize the economy and, [00:08:23] second, that the central bank must take responsibility [00:08:28] for achieving price stability over the medium term. [00:08:32] Fast--forward now to 2003. [00:08:38] In that year, crude oil cost a little more than $30 per barrel. [00:08:44] Since then, crude oil prices have increased more than fourfold, [00:08:49] proportionally about as much as in the 1970s. [00:08:53] Now, as in 1975, [00:08:56] adjusting to such high prices for crude oil has been painful. [00:09:01] Gas prices around $4 a gallon [00:09:04] are a huge burden for many households, [00:09:07] as well as for truckers, manufacturers, farmers, and others. [00:09:11] But, in many other ways, [00:09:17] the economic consequences have been [00:09:18] quite different from those of the 1970s. [00:09:20] One obvious difference is what you don't see: [00:09:24] drivers lining up on odd or even days to buy gasoline [00:09:28] because of price controls or signs at gas stations [00:09:32] that say "No gas". [00:09:36] And until the recent slowdown-- [00:09:37] which is more the result of conditions [00:09:39] in the residential housing market [00:09:41] and in financial markets than of higher oil prices-- [00:09:44] economic growth was solid and unemployment remained low, [00:09:49] unlike what we saw following oil price increases in the 70s. [00:09:55] For a central banker, [00:09:58] a particularly critical difference between then [00:10:01] and now is what has happened to inflation [00:10:04] and inflation expectations. [00:10:07] The overall inflation rate has averaged [00:10:10] about 3.5 percent over the past four quarters, [00:10:15] significantly higher than we would like [00:10:18] but much less than the double-digit rates [00:10:20] that inflation reached in the mid-1970s and then again in 1980. [00:10:26] Moreover, the increase in inflation has been milder this time-- [00:10:31] on the order of 1 percentage point [00:10:34] over the past year as compared with the 6 percentage point jump [00:10:38] that followed the 1973 oil price shock. [00:10:42] From the perspective of monetary policy, [00:10:44] just as important as the behavior of actual inflation is [00:10:48] what households and businesses expect to [00:10:52] happen to inflation in the future, [00:10:54] particularly over the longer term. [00:10:57] If people expect an increase in inflation to be temporary [00:11:01] and do not build it into their longer- [00:11:04] term plans for setting wages and prices, [00:11:07] then the inflation created by a shock to oil prices [00:11:11] will tend to fade relatively quickly. [00:11:14] Some indicators of longer-term inflation expectations [00:11:18] have risen in recent months, [00:11:21] which is a significant concern for the Federal Reserve. [00:11:24] We will need to monitor that situation closely. [00:11:28] However, changes in long-term inflation expectations [00:11:33] have been measured in tenths of a percentage point [00:11:36] this time around rather than in whole percentage points, [00:11:40] as appeared to be the case in the mid-1970s. [00:11:43] Importantly, we see little indication today [00:11:47] of the beginnings of a 1970s-style wage-price spi1ral, [00:11:52] in which wages and prices chased each other ever upward. [00:11:57] A good deal of economic research [00:12:02] has looked at the question of why the inflation [00:12:04] response to the oil shock has been relatively [00:12:07] muted in the current instance. [00:12:09] One factor, which illustrates my point about the adaptability [00:12:14] and flexibility of the U.S. economy, [00:12:20] is the pronounced decline in the energy intensity [00:12:20] of the economy since the 1970s. [00:12:24] Since 1975, the energy required to produce a given amount [00:12:30] of output in the United States [00:12:32] has fallen by about half. [00:12:35] This great improvement in energy efficiency [00:12:38] was less the result of government programs [00:12:41] than of steps taken by households and businesses [00:12:44] in response to higher energy prices, [00:12:48] including substantial investments in more energy-- [00:12:51] efficient equipment and means of transportation. [00:12:54] This improvement in energy efficiency [00:12:57] is one of the reasons why a given increase [00:13:00] in crude oil prices does less damage to the U.S. economy today [00:13:05] than it did in the 1970s. [00:13:08] Another reason is the performance of monetary policy. [00:13:14] The Federal Reserve and other central banks [00:13:18] have learned the lessons of the 1970s. [00:13:21] Because monetary policy works with a lag, [00:13:25] the short-term inflationary effects of a sharp increase [00:13:28] in oil prices can generally not be fully offset. [00:13:33] However, since Paul Volcker's time, [00:13:36] the Federal Reserve has been firmly committed to [00:13:40] maintaining a low and stable rate of inflation over the longer term. [00:13:45] And we recognize that keeping longer-term inflation expectations [00:13:50] well anchored is essential to achieving the goal [00:13:53] of low and stable inflation. [00:13:56] Maintaining confidence in the Fed's commitment [00:14:00] to price stability remains a top priority [00:14:03] as the central bank navigates the current complex situation. [00:14:07] Although our economy has thus far [00:14:13] dealt with the current oil price shock comparatively well, [00:14:17] the United States and the rest of the world [00:14:19] still face significant challenges in dealing with [00:14:23] the rising global demand for energy, [00:14:25] especially if continued demand growth and constrainedsupplies [00:14:31] maintain intense pressure on prices. [00:14:33] The silver lining of high energy prices [00:14:38] is that they provide a powerful incentive for action-- [00:14:41] for conservation, including investment in energy-saving technologies; [00:14:47] for the investment needed to bring new oil supplies to market; [00:14:51] and for the development of alternative conventional [00:14:55] and nonconventional energy sources. [00:14:57] The government, in addition to the market, [00:15:01] can usefully address energy concerns, [00:15:04] for example, by supporting basic research [00:15:07] and adopting well-designed regulatory policies [00:15:11] to promote important social objectives [00:15:16] such as protecting the environment. [00:15:17] As we saw after the oil price shock of the 1970s, [00:15:21] given some time, the economy can become [00:15:25] much more energy-efficient even as [00:15:28] it continues to grow and living standards improve. [00:15:31] Let me turn now to the other economic challenge [00:15:37] that I want to highlight today-- [00:15:39] the productivity performance of our economy. [00:15:42] At this point you may be saying to yourself, [00:15:46] "Is it too late to book Ali G..?" [00:15:49] However, anyone who stayed awake through EC 10 [00:15:53] understands why this issue is so important. [00:15:57] As Adam Smith. pointed out in 1776, [00:16:01] in the long run, more than any other factor, [00:16:04] the productivity of the workforce determines [00:16:07] a nation's standard of living. [00:16:09] The decades following the end of World War II [00:16:15] were remarkable for their industrial innovation and creativity. [00:16:19] From 1948 to 1973, [00:16:23] output per hour of work grew by [00:16:26] nearly 3 percent per year, on average. [00:16:29] But then, for the next 20 years or so, [00:16:32] productivity growth averaged only about 1.5 percent per year, [00:16:37] barely half its previous rate. [00:16:40] Predictably, the rate of increase in the standard of living [00:16:45] slowed as well, and to about the same extent. [00:16:49] The difference between 3 percent and 1.5 percent may sound small. [00:16:54] But at 3 percent per year, [00:16:57] the standard of living would double about [00:17:00] every 23 years, or once every generation; [00:17:04] by contrast, at 1.5 percent, [00:17:07] a doubling would occur only roughly every 47 years, [00:17:12] or once every other generation. [00:17:14] Among the many consequences of the productivity slowdown [00:17:20] was a further complication [00:17:22] for the monetary policy makers of the 1970s. [00:17:25] Detecting shifts in economic trends [00:17:29] is difficult in real time, [00:17:31] and most economists and policymakers did not [00:17:35] fully appreciate the extent [00:17:37] of the productivity slowdown until the late 1970s. [00:17:41] This further influenced the policymakers [00:17:45] of the time toward running a monetary policy [00:17:48] that was too accommodative. [00:17:50] The resulting overheating of the economy [00:17:53] probably exacerbated the inflation problem of that decade. [00:17:59] Productivity growth revived in the mid-1990s, [00:18:05] as I mentioned, [00:18:06] illustrating once again the resilience of the American economy. [00:18:10] Since 1995, productivity has increased at [00:18:15] about a 2.5 percent annual rate. [00:18:18] A great deal of intellectual effort [00:18:21] has been expended in trying to explain [00:18:23] the recent performance and to forecast [00:18:26] the future evolution of productivity. [00:18:29] Much very good work has been conducted here [00:18:33] at Harvard by Dale Jorgenson. [00:18:35] (my senior thesis adviser in 1975, by the way) and his colleagues, [00:18:40] and other important research in the area [00:18:43] has been done at the Federal Reserve Board. [00:18:46] One key finding of that research is that, [00:18:49] to have an economic impact, [00:18:52] technological innovations must be translated [00:18:55] into successful commercial applications. [00:18:58] This country's competitive, market--based system, [00:19:02] its flexible capital and labor markets, [00:19:05] its tradition of entrepreneurship, [00:19:08] and its technological strengths-- [00:19:10] to which Harvard and other universities [00:19:12] make a critical contribution-- [00:19:14] help ensure that that happens on an ongoing basis. [00:19:19] While private-sector initiative [00:19:23] was the key ingredient in generating the pickup [00:19:26] in productivity growth, [00:19:27] government policy was constructive, [00:19:30] in part through support of basic research [00:19:33] but also to a substantial degree [00:19:36] by promoting economic competition. [00:19:39] Beginning in the late 1970s, [00:19:42] the federal government deregulated a number of key industries, [00:19:46] including air travel, trucking, telecommunications, and energy. [00:19:51] The resulting increase in competition [00:19:54] promoted cost reductions and innovation, [00:19:58] leading in turn to new products and industries. [00:20:01] It is difficult to imagine [00:20:04] that we would have online retailing today [00:20:08] if the transportation and telecommunications industries [00:20:12] had not been deregulated. [00:20:14] In addition, the lowering of trade barriers [00:20:17] promoted productivity gains by increasing competition, [00:20:21] expanding markets, and increasing the pace of technology transfer. [00:20:26] Finally, as a central banker, [00:20:30] I would be remiss if I failed to mention the contribution [00:20:34] of monetary policy to the improved productivity performance. [00:20:38] By damping business cycles [00:20:42] and by keeping inflation under control, [00:20:45] a sound monetary policy improves the ability [00:20:48] of households and firms to plan [00:20:51] and increases their willingness to undertake [00:20:54] the investments in skills, research, [00:20:57] and physical capital needed to support [00:20:59] continuing gains in productivity. [00:21:02] Just as the productivity slowdown [00:21:06] was associated with a slower growth [00:21:09] of real per capita income, [00:21:10] the productivity resurgence since the mid-1990s [00:21:15] has been accompanied by a pickup in real income growth. [00:21:19] One measure of average living standards, [00:21:23] real consumption per capita, [00:21:25] is nearly 35 percent higher today than in 1995. [00:21:31] In addition, the flood of innovation [00:21:35] that helped spur the productivity resurgence [00:21:38] has created many new job opportunities, [00:21:41] and more than a few fortunes. [00:21:43] But changing technology has also reduced job opportunities [00:21:48] for some others--bank tellers and assembly-line workers, for example. [00:21:53] And that is the crux of a whole new set of challenges. [00:21:57] Even though average economic well--being [00:22:03] has increased considerably over time, [00:22:05] the degree of inequality in economic outcomes [00:22:09] over the past three decades has increased as well. [00:22:13] Economists continue to grapple with [00:22:16] the reasons for this trend. [00:22:18] But as best we can tell, [00:22:20] the increase in inequality probably [00:22:23] is due to a number of factors, [00:22:25] notably including technological change [00:22:28] that seems to have favored higher-skilled workers [00:22:32] more than lower-skilled ones. [00:22:34] In addition, some economists point to increased international trade [00:22:39] and the declining role of labor unions. [00:22:42] as other, probably lesser contributing factors. [00:22:46] What should we do about rising economic inequality? [00:22:53] Answering this question inevitably involves [00:22:57] difficult value judgments and tradeoffs. [00:22:59] But approaches that inhibit the dynamism [00:23:03] of our economy would clearly be a step [00:23:06] in the wrong direction. [00:23:07] To be sure, new technologies and increased international trade [00:23:12] can lead to painful dislocations [00:23:15] as some workers lose their jobs [00:23:17] or see the demand for their particular skills decline. [00:23:21] However, hindering the adoption of new technologies [00:23:26] or inhibiting trade flows would do far more harm [00:23:30] than good over the longer haul. [00:23:32] In the short term, [00:23:34] the better approach is to adopt policies [00:23:37] that help those who are displaced by economic change. [00:23:40] By doing so, we not only provide assistance to those [00:23:45] who need it but help to secure public support [00:23:48] for the economic flexibility that is essential for prosperity. [00:23:53] In the long term, however, [00:23:57] the best way by far to improve economic opportunity [00:24:01] and to reduce inequality is to [00:24:04] increase the educational attainment and skills of American workers. [00:24:09] The productivity surge in the decades [00:24:13] after World War II corresponded to a period [00:24:17] in which educational attainment was increasing rapidly; [00:24:21] in recent decades, progress on that front has been far slower. [00:24:27] Moreover, inequalities in education [00:24:30] and in access to education remain high. [00:24:33] As we think about improving education and skills, [00:24:37] we should also look beyond the traditional K-12 [00:24:42] and 4-year-college system-- [00:24:43] as important as it is-- [00:24:45] to recognize that education should be lifelong [00:24:49] and can come in many forms. [00:24:51] Early childhood education, community colleges, [00:24:55] vocational schools, on-the-job training, online courses, [00:25:00] adult education -- all of these are vehicles of demonstrated value [00:25:05] in increasing skills and lifetime earning power. [00:25:09] The use of a wide range of methods to [00:25:13] address the pressing problems of inadequate skills [00:25:16] and economic inequality would be entirely [00:25:20] consistent with the themes of economic adaptability [00:25:23] and flexibility that I have emphasized in my remarks. [00:25:28] I will close by shifting from the topic of education [00:25:34] in general to your education specifically. [00:25:36] Through effort, talent, and doubtless some luck, [00:25:41] you have succeeded in acquiring an excellent education. [00:25:45] Your education--more precisely, [00:25:48] your ability to think critically and creatively-- [00:25:51] is your greatest asset. [00:25:54] And unlike many assets, [00:25:56] the more you draw on it, the faster it grows. [00:25:59] Put it to good use. [00:26:01] The poor forecasting record of economists is legendary, [00:26:07] but I will make a forecast in which I am very confident: [00:26:12] Whatever you expect your life and work [00:26:15] to be like 10, 20, or 30 years from now, [00:26:19] the reality will be quite different. [00:26:22] In looking over the 30th anniversary report on my own class, [00:26:27] I was struck by the great diversity of vocations and avocations [00:26:32] that have engaged my classmates. [00:26:34] To be sure, the volume was full of attorneys