《Try to Be as Prepared as Possible for Opportunities and D》歌词

歌曲： Try to Be as Prepared as Possible for Opportunities and D

所属专辑：美国名校励志演说 17篇

歌手： 爱飘的夜

时长： 28:32

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Try to Be as Prepared as Possible for Opportunities and Disappointments - 英语演讲 [00:00:02]

"Remarks on Class Day 2008" by Ben S. Bernanke,[00:00:07]

Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System[00:00:12]

It seems to me, paradoxically, [00:00:17]

that both long ago and only yesterday [00:00:21]

I attended my own Class Day in 1975.[00:00:24]

I am pleased and honored to be invited back [00:00:29]

by the students of Harvard. [00:00:32]

Our speaker in 1975 was Dick Gregory,[00:00:34]

the social critic and comedian,[00:00:38]

who was inclined toward the sharp-edged and satiric.[00:00:40]

Central bankers don't do satire as a rule, [00:00:44]

so I am going to have to strive for "kind of interesting". [00:00:47]

When I attended Class Day as a graduating senior,[00:00:52]

Gerald Ford was President, [00:00:58]

and an up-and-coming fellow named Alan Greenspan[00:01:00]

was his chief economic adviser.[00:01:04]

Just weeks earlier, [00:01:07]

the last Americans remaining in Saigon[00:01:09]

had been evacuated by helicopters. [00:01:11]

On a happier note, [00:01:14]

the Red Sox were on their way[00:01:16]

to winning the American League pennant.[00:01:18]

I skipped classes to attend a World Series game[00:01:20]

against the Cincinnati Reds. [00:01:24]

As was their wont in those days, [00:01:26]

the Sox came agonizingly close to a championship[00:01:29]

but ended up snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.[00:01:33]

On that score, as on others-disco music [00:01:37]

and Pet Rocks come to mind--[00:01:42]

many things are better today than they were then.[00:01:44]

In fact, that will be a theme of my remarks today. [00:01:47]

Although 1975 was a pretty good year for the Red Sox, [00:01:51]

it was not a good one for the U.S. economy. [00:01:58]

Then as now, we were experiencing a serious oil price shock, [00:02:02]

sharply rising prices for food and other commodities, [00:02:07]

and subpar economic growth.[00:02:11]

But I see the differences between the economy of 1975 [00:02:14]

and the economy of 2008 as more telling than the similarities. [00:02:19]

Today's situation differs from that of 33 years ago[00:02:25]

in large part because our economy and society[00:02:29]

have become much more flexible and able to[00:02:33]

adapt to difficult situations and new challenges.[00:02:36]

Economic policymaking has improved as well, [00:02:40]

I believe, partly because we have learned well [00:02:44]

some of the hard lessons of the past.[00:02:47]

Of course, I do not want to minimize the challenges[00:02:50]

we currently face, and I will come back to a few of these. [00:02:54]

But I do think that our demonstrated ability[00:02:58]

to respond constructively and effectively to past economic problems[00:03:01]

provides a basis for optimism about the future. [00:03:06]

I will focus my remarks today on two economic issues [00:03:10]

that challenged us in the 1970s and that still do so today--[00:03:16]

energy and productivity.[00:03:21]

These, obviously, are not the kind of topics [00:03:24]

chosen by many recent Class Day speakers----Will Farrell, Ali G..,[00:03:27]

or Seth MacFarlane, to name a few.[00:03:33]

But, then, the Class Marshals presumably knew [00:03:35]

what they were getting when they invited an economist. [00:03:39]

Because the members of today's graduating class--[00:03:42]

and some of your professors-- [00:03:48]

were not yet born in 1975,[00:03:50]

let me begin by briefly surveying the economic landscape in the mid-1970s.[00:03:52]

The economy had just gone through a severe recession, [00:03:59]

during which output, income, and employment fell sharply [00:04:04]

and the unemployment rate rose to 9 percent.[00:04:08]

Meanwhile, consumer price inflation,[00:04:12]

which had been around 3 percent to 4 percent earlier in the decade,[00:04:16]

soared to more than 10 percent during my senior year. [00:04:20]

The oil price shock of the 1970s began in October 1973 when,[00:04:25]

in response to the Yom Kippur War, [00:04:33]

Arab oil producers imposed an embargo on exports.[00:04:36]

Before the embargo, in 1972, [00:04:41]

the price of imported oil was about $3.20 per barrel;[00:04:44]

by 1975, the average price was nearly $14 per barrel, [00:04:49]

more than four times greater.[00:04:56]

President Nixon had imposed economy--[00:04:58]

wide controls on wages and prices in 1971,[00:05:02]

including prices of petroleum products; [00:05:06]

in November 1973, in the wake of the embargo, t[00:05:09]

he President placed additional controls on petroleum prices.[00:05:15]

As basic economics predicts,[00:05:19]

when a scarce resource cannot be allocated by market--[00:05:22]

determined prices, it will be allocated some other way--[00:05:26]

in this case, in what was to become an iconic symbol of the times, [00:05:30]

by long lines at gasoline stations. [00:05:35]

In 1974, in an attempt to overcome [00:05:38]

the unintended consequences of price controls,[00:05:43]

drivers in many places were permitted to[00:05:47]

buy gasoline only on odd or even days of the month, [00:05:50]

depending on the last digit of their license plate number.[00:05:54]

Moreover, with the controlled price of U.S.[00:05:58]

crude oil well below world prices, [00:06:01]

growth in domestic exploration slowed [00:06:03]

and production was curtailed--which, [00:06:09]

of course, only made things worse. [00:06:10]

In addition to creating long lines at gasoline stations,[00:06:12]

the oil price shock exacerbated what was already[00:06:18]

an intensifying buildup of inflation and inflation expectations. [00:06:22]

In another echo of today,[00:06:28]

the inflationary situation was further worsened [00:06:30]

by rapidly rising prices of agricultural products and other commodities. [00:06:33]

Economists generally agree that monetary policy [00:06:39]

performed poorly during this period.[00:06:45]

In part, this was because policymakers, [00:06:47]

in choosing what they believed to be [00:06:51]

the appropriate setting for monetary policy, [00:06:53]

overestimated the productive capacity of the economy.[00:06:56]

I'll have more to say about this shortly.[00:07:00]

Federal Reserve policymakers also underestimated [00:07:03]

both their own contributions to the inflationary problems [00:07:08]

of the time and their ability to curb that inflation.[00:07:12]

For example, on occasion they blamed inflation [00:07:16]

on so-called cost-push factors [00:07:21]

such as union wage pressures and price increases by large, [00:07:23]

market-dominating firms; [00:07:28]

however, the abilities of unions and firms[00:07:29]

to push through inflationary wage [00:07:33]

and price increases were symptoms of the problem,[00:07:36]

not the underlying cause. [00:07:39]

Several years passed before the Federal Reserve[00:07:41]

gained a new leadership that better understood [00:07:46]

the central bank's role in the inflation process [00:07:49]

and that sustained anti-inflationary monetary policies would actually work.[00:07:52]

Beginning in 1979,[00:07:59]

such policies were implemented successfully--[00:08:01]

although not without significant cost [00:08:04]

in terms of lost output and employment--[00:08:07]

under Fed Chairman Paul Volcker.[00:08:10]

For the Federal Reserve,[00:08:13]

two crucial lessons from this experience were, [00:08:15]

first, that high inflation can seriously destabilize the economy and, [00:08:18]

second, that the central bank must take responsibility [00:08:23]

for achieving price stability over the medium term. [00:08:28]

Fast--forward now to 2003. [00:08:32]

In that year, crude oil cost a little more than $30 per barrel.[00:08:38]

Since then, crude oil prices have increased more than fourfold, [00:08:44]

proportionally about as much as in the 1970s.[00:08:49]

Now, as in 1975, [00:08:53]

adjusting to such high prices for crude oil has been painful. [00:08:56]

Gas prices around $4 a gallon [00:09:01]

are a huge burden for many households, [00:09:04]

as well as for truckers, manufacturers, farmers, and others. [00:09:07]

But, in many other ways,[00:09:11]

the economic consequences have been[00:09:17]

quite different from those of the 1970s.[00:09:18]

One obvious difference is what you don't see: [00:09:20]

drivers lining up on odd or even days to buy gasoline[00:09:24]

because of price controls or signs at gas stations [00:09:28]

that say "No gas".[00:09:32]

And until the recent slowdown--[00:09:36]

which is more the result of conditions [00:09:37]

in the residential housing market [00:09:39]

and in financial markets than of higher oil prices--[00:09:41]

economic growth was solid and unemployment remained low, [00:09:44]

unlike what we saw following oil price increases in the 70s. [00:09:49]

For a central banker, [00:09:55]

a particularly critical difference between then [00:09:58]

and now is what has happened to inflation [00:10:01]

and inflation expectations.[00:10:04]

The overall inflation rate has averaged[00:10:07]

about 3.5 percent over the past four quarters, [00:10:10]

significantly higher than we would like [00:10:15]

but much less than the double-digit rates [00:10:18]

that inflation reached in the mid-1970s and then again in 1980.[00:10:20]

Moreover, the increase in inflation has been milder this time--[00:10:26]

on the order of 1 percentage point [00:10:31]

over the past year as compared with the 6 percentage point jump[00:10:34]

that followed the 1973 oil price shock.[00:10:38]

From the perspective of monetary policy, [00:10:42]

just as important as the behavior of actual inflation is [00:10:44]

what households and businesses expect to [00:10:48]

happen to inflation in the future,[00:10:52]

particularly over the longer term.[00:10:54]

If people expect an increase in inflation to be temporary [00:10:57]

and do not build it into their longer-[00:11:01]

term plans for setting wages and prices, [00:11:04]

then the inflation created by a shock to oil prices[00:11:07]

will tend to fade relatively quickly. [00:11:11]

Some indicators of longer-term inflation expectations [00:11:14]

have risen in recent months,[00:11:18]

which is a significant concern for the Federal Reserve.[00:11:21]

We will need to monitor that situation closely.[00:11:24]

However, changes in long-term inflation expectations[00:11:28]

have been measured in tenths of a percentage point [00:11:33]

this time around rather than in whole percentage points, [00:11:36]

as appeared to be the case in the mid-1970s.[00:11:40]

Importantly, we see little indication today [00:11:43]

of the beginnings of a 1970s-style wage-price spi1ral,[00:11:47]

in which wages and prices chased each other ever upward. [00:11:52]

A good deal of economic research [00:11:57]

has looked at the question of why the inflation [00:12:02]

response to the oil shock has been relatively[00:12:04]

muted in the current instance.[00:12:07]

One factor, which illustrates my point about the adaptability [00:12:09]

and flexibility of the U.S. economy, [00:12:14]

is the pronounced decline in the energy intensity[00:12:20]

of the economy since the 1970s.[00:12:20]

Since 1975, the energy required to produce a given amount[00:12:24]

of output in the United States[00:12:30]

has fallen by about half.[00:12:32]

This great improvement in energy efficiency[00:12:35]

was less the result of government programs[00:12:38]

than of steps taken by households and businesses [00:12:41]

in response to higher energy prices,[00:12:44]

including substantial investments in more energy--[00:12:48]

efficient equipment and means of transportation.[00:12:51]

This improvement in energy efficiency[00:12:54]

is one of the reasons why a given increase[00:12:57]

in crude oil prices does less damage to the U.S. economy today [00:13:00]

than it did in the 1970s. [00:13:05]

Another reason is the performance of monetary policy. [00:13:08]

The Federal Reserve and other central banks[00:13:14]

have learned the lessons of the 1970s.[00:13:18]

Because monetary policy works with a lag, [00:13:21]

the short-term inflationary effects of a sharp increase[00:13:25]

in oil prices can generally not be fully offset.[00:13:28]

However, since Paul Volcker's time,[00:13:33]

the Federal Reserve has been firmly committed to [00:13:36]

maintaining a low and stable rate of inflation over the longer term. [00:13:40]

And we recognize that keeping longer-term inflation expectations [00:13:45]

well anchored is essential to achieving the goal[00:13:50]

of low and stable inflation. [00:13:53]

Maintaining confidence in the Fed's commitment[00:13:56]

to price stability remains a top priority[00:14:00]

as the central bank navigates the current complex situation.[00:14:03]

Although our economy has thus far[00:14:07]

dealt with the current oil price shock comparatively well,[00:14:13]

the United States and the rest of the world[00:14:17]

still face significant challenges in dealing with [00:14:19]

the rising global demand for energy, [00:14:23]

especially if continued demand growth and constrainedsupplies[00:14:25]

maintain intense pressure on prices. [00:14:31]

The silver lining of high energy prices [00:14:33]

is that they provide a powerful incentive for action--[00:14:38]

for conservation, including investment in energy-saving technologies;[00:14:41]

for the investment needed to bring new oil supplies to market;[00:14:47]

and for the development of alternative conventional[00:14:51]

and nonconventional energy sources.[00:14:55]

The government, in addition to the market, [00:14:57]

can usefully address energy concerns, [00:15:01]

for example, by supporting basic research [00:15:04]

and adopting well-designed regulatory policies[00:15:07]

to promote important social objectives [00:15:11]

such as protecting the environment.[00:15:16]

As we saw after the oil price shock of the 1970s,[00:15:17]

given some time, the economy can become [00:15:21]

much more energy-efficient even as [00:15:25]

it continues to grow and living standards improve. [00:15:28]

Let me turn now to the other economic challenge[00:15:31]

that I want to highlight today--[00:15:37]

the productivity performance of our economy. [00:15:39]

At this point you may be saying to yourself, [00:15:42]

"Is it too late to book Ali G..?"[00:15:46]

However, anyone who stayed awake through EC 10[00:15:49]

understands why this issue is so important.[00:15:53]

As Adam Smith. pointed out in 1776, [00:15:57]

in the long run, more than any other factor, [00:16:01]

the productivity of the workforce determines[00:16:04]

a nation's standard of living. [00:16:07]

The decades following the end of World War II[00:16:09]

were remarkable for their industrial innovation and creativity. [00:16:15]

From 1948 to 1973, [00:16:19]

output per hour of work grew by[00:16:23]

nearly 3 percent per year, on average.[00:16:26]

But then, for the next 20 years or so,[00:16:29]

productivity growth averaged only about 1.5 percent per year,[00:16:32]

barely half its previous rate.[00:16:37]

Predictably, the rate of increase in the standard of living [00:16:40]

slowed as well, and to about the same extent.[00:16:45]

The difference between 3 percent and 1.5 percent may sound small. [00:16:49]

But at 3 percent per year, [00:16:54]

the standard of living would double about[00:16:57]

every 23 years, or once every generation;[00:17:00]

by contrast, at 1.5 percent,[00:17:04]

a doubling would occur only roughly every 47 years, [00:17:07]

or once every other generation. [00:17:12]

Among the many consequences of the productivity slowdown[00:17:14]

was a further complication [00:17:20]

for the monetary policy makers of the 1970s.[00:17:22]

Detecting shifts in economic trends [00:17:25]

is difficult in real time, [00:17:29]

and most economists and policymakers did not[00:17:31]

fully appreciate the extent [00:17:35]

of the productivity slowdown until the late 1970s.[00:17:37]

This further influenced the policymakers[00:17:41]

of the time toward running a monetary policy [00:17:45]

that was too accommodative. [00:17:48]

The resulting overheating of the economy[00:17:50]

probably exacerbated the inflation problem of that decade. [00:17:53]

Productivity growth revived in the mid-1990s, [00:17:59]

as I mentioned,[00:18:05]

illustrating once again the resilience of the American economy.[00:18:06]

Since 1995, productivity has increased at [00:18:10]

about a 2.5 percent annual rate.[00:18:15]

A great deal of intellectual effort[00:18:18]

has been expended in trying to explain [00:18:21]

the recent performance and to forecast [00:18:23]

the future evolution of productivity.[00:18:26]

Much very good work has been conducted here[00:18:29]

at Harvard by Dale Jorgenson. [00:18:33]

(my senior thesis adviser in 1975, by the way) and his colleagues,[00:18:35]

and other important research in the area [00:18:40]

has been done at the Federal Reserve Board. [00:18:43]

One key finding of that research is that,[00:18:46]

to have an economic impact, [00:18:49]

technological innovations must be translated[00:18:52]

into successful commercial applications. [00:18:55]

This country's competitive, market--based system, [00:18:58]

its flexible capital and labor markets, [00:19:02]

its tradition of entrepreneurship, [00:19:05]

and its technological strengths--[00:19:08]

to which Harvard and other universities [00:19:10]

make a critical contribution--[00:19:12]

help ensure that that happens on an ongoing basis. [00:19:14]

While private-sector initiative[00:19:19]

was the key ingredient in generating the pickup [00:19:23]

in productivity growth, [00:19:26]

government policy was constructive, [00:19:27]

in part through support of basic research [00:19:30]

but also to a substantial degree[00:19:33]

by promoting economic competition.[00:19:36]

Beginning in the late 1970s, [00:19:39]

the federal government deregulated a number of key industries, [00:19:42]

including air travel, trucking, telecommunications, and energy.[00:19:46]

The resulting increase in competition [00:19:51]

promoted cost reductions and innovation,[00:19:54]

leading in turn to new products and industries.[00:19:58]

It is difficult to imagine [00:20:01]

that we would have online retailing today [00:20:04]

if the transportation and telecommunications industries[00:20:08]

had not been deregulated.[00:20:12]

In addition, the lowering of trade barriers [00:20:14]

promoted productivity gains by increasing competition,[00:20:17]

expanding markets, and increasing the pace of technology transfer. [00:20:21]

Finally, as a central banker,[00:20:26]

I would be remiss if I failed to mention the contribution [00:20:30]

of monetary policy to the improved productivity performance.[00:20:34]

By damping business cycles [00:20:38]

and by keeping inflation under control,[00:20:42]

a sound monetary policy improves the ability[00:20:45]

of households and firms to plan [00:20:48]

and increases their willingness to undertake [00:20:51]

the investments in skills, research, [00:20:54]

and physical capital needed to support [00:20:57]

continuing gains in productivity. [00:20:59]

Just as the productivity slowdown [00:21:02]

was associated with a slower growth [00:21:06]

of real per capita income,[00:21:09]

the productivity resurgence since the mid-1990s[00:21:10]

has been accompanied by a pickup in real income growth.[00:21:15]

One measure of average living standards, [00:21:19]

real consumption per capita,[00:21:23]

is nearly 35 percent higher today than in 1995.[00:21:25]

In addition, the flood of innovation [00:21:31]

that helped spur the productivity resurgence [00:21:35]

has created many new job opportunities, [00:21:38]

and more than a few fortunes.[00:21:41]

But changing technology has also reduced job opportunities[00:21:43]

for some others--bank tellers and assembly-line workers, for example.[00:21:48]

And that is the crux of a whole new set of challenges. [00:21:53]

Even though average economic well--being [00:21:57]

has increased considerably over time, [00:22:03]

the degree of inequality in economic outcomes[00:22:05]

over the past three decades has increased as well.[00:22:09]

Economists continue to grapple with [00:22:13]

the reasons for this trend. [00:22:16]

But as best we can tell, [00:22:18]

the increase in inequality probably[00:22:20]

is due to a number of factors,[00:22:23]

notably including technological change[00:22:25]

that seems to have favored higher-skilled workers[00:22:28]

more than lower-skilled ones. [00:22:32]

In addition, some economists point to increased international trade[00:22:34]

and the declining role of labor unions. [00:22:39]

as other, probably lesser contributing factors. [00:22:42]

What should we do about rising economic inequality?[00:22:46]

Answering this question inevitably involves[00:22:53]

difficult value judgments and tradeoffs.[00:22:57]

But approaches that inhibit the dynamism [00:22:59]

of our economy would clearly be a step [00:23:03]

in the wrong direction. [00:23:06]

To be sure, new technologies and increased international trade[00:23:07]

can lead to painful dislocations [00:23:12]

as some workers lose their jobs [00:23:15]

or see the demand for their particular skills decline.[00:23:17]

However, hindering the adoption of new technologies [00:23:21]

or inhibiting trade flows would do far more harm [00:23:26]

than good over the longer haul.[00:23:30]

In the short term, [00:23:32]

the better approach is to adopt policies[00:23:34]

that help those who are displaced by economic change. [00:23:37]

By doing so, we not only provide assistance to those [00:23:40]

who need it but help to secure public support [00:23:45]

for the economic flexibility that is essential for prosperity. [00:23:48]

In the long term, however, [00:23:53]

the best way by far to improve economic opportunity [00:23:57]

and to reduce inequality is to[00:24:01]

increase the educational attainment and skills of American workers. [00:24:04]

The productivity surge in the decades [00:24:09]

after World War II corresponded to a period [00:24:13]

in which educational attainment was increasing rapidly; [00:24:17]

in recent decades, progress on that front has been far slower.[00:24:21]

Moreover, inequalities in education [00:24:27]

and in access to education remain high. [00:24:30]

As we think about improving education and skills,[00:24:33]

we should also look beyond the traditional K-12 [00:24:37]

and 4-year-college system--[00:24:42]

as important as it is--[00:24:43]

to recognize that education should be lifelong [00:24:45]

and can come in many forms. [00:24:49]

Early childhood education, community colleges,[00:24:51]

vocational schools, on-the-job training, online courses,[00:24:55]

adult education -- all of these are vehicles of demonstrated value[00:25:00]

in increasing skills and lifetime earning power.[00:25:05]

The use of a wide range of methods to [00:25:09]

address the pressing problems of inadequate skills[00:25:13]

and economic inequality would be entirely [00:25:16]

consistent with the themes of economic adaptability[00:25:20]

and flexibility that I have emphasized in my remarks. [00:25:23]

I will close by shifting from the topic of education[00:25:28]

in general to your education specifically.[00:25:34]

Through effort, talent, and doubtless some luck, [00:25:36]

you have succeeded in acquiring an excellent education. [00:25:41]

Your education--more precisely,[00:25:45]

your ability to think critically and creatively--[00:25:48]

is your greatest asset. [00:25:51]

And unlike many assets, [00:25:54]

the more you draw on it, the faster it grows. [00:25:56]

Put it to good use. [00:25:59]

The poor forecasting record of economists is legendary, [00:26:01]

but I will make a forecast in which I am very confident:[00:26:07]

Whatever you expect your life and work[00:26:12]

to be like 10, 20, or 30 years from now, [00:26:15]

the reality will be quite different. [00:26:19]

In looking over the 30th anniversary report on my own class,[00:26:22]

I was struck by the great diversity of vocations and avocations[00:26:27]

that have engaged my classmates.[00:26:32]

To be sure, the volume was full of attorneys[00:26:34]

and physicians and professors[00:26:39]

as well as architects, engineers, editors, bankers, [00:26:41]

and even a few economists.[00:26:45]

Many listed the title "vice president," and, [00:26:47]

not a few, "president." [00:26:52]

But the Class of 1975 also includes those[00:26:55]

who listed their occupations as composer, [00:27:00]

environmental advocate, musician, playwright,[00:27:02]

rabbi, conflict resolution coach, painter,[00:27:07]

community organizer, and essayist. [00:27:11]

And even for those of us with the more conventional job descriptions, [00:27:14]

the nature of our daily work and its relationship [00:27:19]

to the economy and society is,[00:27:23]

I am sure, very different from [00:27:25]

what we might have guessed in 1975.[00:27:28]

My point is only that you cannot predict your path.[00:27:31]

You can only try to be as prepared as possible[00:27:36]

for the opportunities, [00:27:40]

as well as the disappointments,[00:27:42]

that will come your way. [00:27:45]

For people, as for economies,[00:27:49]

adaptability and flexibility count for a great deal. [00:27:52]

Wherever your path leads, [00:27:57]

I hope you use your considerable talents and energy [00:27:59]

in endeavors that engage and excite you [00:28:01]

and benefit not only yourselves, [00:28:04]

but also in some measure your country and your world. [00:28:07]

Today, I wish you and your families a day of joyous celebration.[00:28:12]

Congratulations. [00:28:18]